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ABSTRACT: Drawing from previous debates on the topic of
state- and nation-building in this journal, this article offers a baseline understanding of the theories of democratization. It then
provides a convenient visualization of the political transition from
an autocratic or failed state to democracy. This visualization should
be useful to practitioners and policymakers engaged in strategically
expanding democracy.

T

he officially stated goal in Iraq was, and the ultimate political
objective of many recent US ground military operations has
been, promoting democracy.1 In two recent Parameters articles on
nation-building, it became clear that a general disagreement exists over
whether postconflict rebuilding can realistically entail creating a “successful democracy.”2 Obviously, understanding what it takes to promote
democracy “can precondition the Army’s ability not only to fight effectively but also to secure the political objectives of war.”3 If the ultimate
end state includes the successful transition from military authority to
democratic civilian authority, then it is incumbent upon military commanders to set conditions for the success of the nascent democracy.
To do this, commanders and planners need a basic understanding of
democratization even though guidance for military leaders on how to
promote democracy is lacking.
Broadly speaking, there are two methods to promote democracy.4
The political approach concentrates on building institutions that support
democracy by transition from autocracy to democracy. Alternatively, the
developmental approach concentrates on setting conditions for a stable
democracy to develop over time. Success requires both. Even though
applying only the political approach leaves out key social aspects of
democratization, most doctrinal literature concentrates on the political
approach and neglects the developmental approach, making the task
look far easier than it really is.
This article explores what the developmental approach can provide
strategists and planners and offers a rudimentary, but quantifiable,
1 Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of
U.S. Foreign Policy?, Report RL34296 (Washington, DC: US Congressional Research Service, 2007);
and Thomas Carothers, Democracy Promotion under Obama: Finding a Way Forward, Policy Brief 77
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009).
2 M. Chris Mason, “Nation-Building is an Oxymoron,” Parameters 46, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 68.
See also Charles J. Sullivan, “State-Building: America’s Foreign Policy Challenge,” Parameters 46, no.
1 (Spring 2016).
3 Joseph Roger Clark, “To Win Wars, Correct the Army’s Political Blind Spot,” Parameters 45, no.
4 (Winter 2015–16): 37.
4 Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?,” Journal of Democracy
20, no. 1 (2009): 5–19.
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understanding of the efforts necessary to transition and consolidate from
an unstable state to a viable democracy. This discourse does not explore
the academic nature of democracy but distills an extremely complex
sociopolitical event down to its essence—the fewest possible variables
that still yield a demonstrable relationship—to provide a simple way to
conceptualize and visualize the transition to democracy. While discussing
other metrics, this analysis focuses on theories of democratization, the
process of democratization, a functional definition of democracy, and
the most salient democratization data points. An introduction on using
key metrics to estimate timelines relevant to defense policy is also provided. The article concludes with some thoughts on factors to consider
when discussing democratization with civilian leaders and policymakers.

Theories of Democratic Transitions

The causes of a society’s transition from an autocratic to democratic
government are not fully understood. Over the years, researchers have
proposed multiple theories that are generally placed into one of four categories: social structural evolution, where both the elite and the general
populations simply witness the inevitable transformation of civilization;
top down, driven by the elites; bottom up, forced by the general populace; or a hybrid combination of the three.
The structural approach, commonly referred to as modernization
theory, recognizes a societal correlation between democracy and certain
structural factors that usually include average income, average education, availability of media sources, and levels of industrialization and
urbanization.5 Namely, increases in income, education, and urbanization
associated with industrialization create conditions favorable for democracy. With these changes, the population adopts “equalitarian” value
systems. Because “groups will regard a political system as legitimate or
illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit in with their
primary values,” as a society’s values shift, so does its political system.6
Top-down approaches that apply strategic bargaining theories
of democratization deal primarily with the period of transition from
autocracy to democracy. Elites drive the process, forcing democracy
upon the general population, which has no influence on events. The
approach gives no consideration as to why, but only how, democratization occurs. The theory concentrates on the political elites and breaks
down the transition into phases. During the preparatory phase, a new
elite is born out of the leaderless masses. In the decision phase, the new
political and economic elites challenge the existing power structure.
Eventually, the current autocrat and the new challengers strike a deal
to allow elections. Autocrats only take this distasteful option when they
see they have little choice. Rather than totally lose power, they engage
in a power-sharing arrangement. In the habituation phase, elements of
democracy become more ingrained into society’s structures; democracy

5 Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development
and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (March 1959): 69–105,
doi:10.2307/1951731.
6 Ibid., 105, 86–87.
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triumphs.7 This theory treats democracy as “a matter primarily of
procedure rather than of substance.”8
The idea that social forces from within a society drive democratic
transitions contrasts with the elites-only approach. In this bottom-up
notion, economic progress acting over an extended period creates a
diverse social structure where the autocrats and their vassals become
dependent upon the middle class for everything from specialized goods
to economic support. Eventually, the middle class demands more of
the privileges once restricted to the ruling elites, including influence in
political decision-making.9 Commonly associated with this approach to
democratization is the idea that the existence of democracy depends on
an economic middle class.10
Today, almost no theory is purely structural, elite driven, or population driven, which leads to the hybrid approach. Most of these methods
consider how structural factors affect populations to cause change;
for example, some hybrid theories examine the political economy to
understand how short-term economic conditions change the bargaining
powers of various political actors.11 Others explore how economic security causes a society to change its value structure from one less supportive
of democratic systems to one that supports prodemocratic change.12

Process of Democratic Transition

While theories on why countries transition from autocracy to
democracy are still widely debated, most experts recognize the process
of democratization includes the three phases of liberalization, transition,
and consolidation. Liberalization is “the process of making effective
certain rights that protect both the individual and social groups from
arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties.”13
Liberalization is easy to overlook because it often occurs as part of a
slow, indistinct process of social change.14 While some theories fail to
separate transition from the liberalization phase, other models recognize the process of legally formalizing the rights demanded during the
liberalization phase as a central component of democratization.
The second phase, transition, occurs as political leaders write
constitutions and create the political instruments necessary to run a
democracy. Even though many people consider this portion complete
7 Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics
2, no. 3 (April 1970): 337–63, doi:10.2307/421307.
8 Ibid., 345.
9 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of
the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
10 Ibid., 418.
11 Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
12 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The
Human Development Sequence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
13 Carston Q. Schneider and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation:
Measuring the Components of Democratization,” in Twenty Years of Studying Democratization, vol. 1 of
Democratic Transitions and Consolidations, ed. Aurel Croissant and Jeffrey Haynes (London: Routledge,
2014), 45.
14 See Schneider and Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation,” 64–65 for
examples of lengthy liberalization such as Poland, which began in the 1980s and completed in 1998,
as well as many North African countries, which have yet to complete liberalization even though it
began much earlier.

60

Parameters 47(1) Spring 2017

after the first free and fair election, it may take several years to replace
all the autocratic organs of government with democratic ones. The
final phase, consolidation, starts at the end of the transition phase and
continues until the country’s fall back into autocracy appears unlikely.
Successful consolidation can take decades. Most stabilization operations
occur during transition and consolidation phases.

Definition of Democracy

Before moving to specific metrics, we must define democracy. Many
doctrinal guides already provide lines of effort associated with stabilizing a host nation’s government; however, neither Joint Publication 3-07
nor Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 3-07 defines democracy.15
For such a definition to be useful, it should be in terms of the host nation
government and nested into the concept of legitimacy as “a condition
based upon the perception by specific audiences of the legal or moral
rightness of a set of actions, and the propriety as well as authority of
the individuals or organizations in taking them” already used in the
doctrine.16 This definition derives from Max Weber’s basic concept of
legitimacy as the “right to rule.”17 The perception of the right to rule is
founded in the population’s belief that the government has the legal and
moral authority, the legitimacy, to govern. But, what about the legitimacy of the method or type of government?
A difference that may be best distinguished by how people refer to
the government, democracy is a type of governmental system and not a
specific government. Governments, for example, include the “Bashar alAssad regime” or “Bush administration” while phrases such as “Syria is
a monarchy” or “the United States is a democracy” reflect governmental
systems. The legitimacy of a specific government, however, is tied to the
rulers: how did the authorities gain their positions and do they rule in
accordance with the values of the society? If the ultimate power of the
government is God or holy scriptures, the government is a theocracy. If
authority is tied to an ethnic group or ethnic identity, the system is an
ethnocracy, many of which are monarchies.
The legitimacy of a democracy is based on the idea that each citizen
has rights equal to other citizens regardless of social position, race, tribal
or ethnic affi liation, or religious beliefs. Therefore, a practical definition
of democracy is “a type of government whose source of legitimacy is a
grant of authority given to the government by the individual citizens
acting as individuals.”
As the population begins to recognize individual rights during liberalization, democracy takes firmer root. For it to survive, a population
that is at least partially liberalized must be willing to embrace individual
human rights and liberties over traditional parochial values that favor
in-group members in political and economic matters. Recognizing individual citizens as having equal political rights is essential to creating the
conditions for a stable democratic state.
15 US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Stability, Joint Publication 3-07 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2016);
and Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), Stability, Army Doctrinal Reference
Publication 3-07 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2012).
16 JCS, JP 3-07, I-15.
17 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and
Claus Wittich, trans. Ephraim Fischoff et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
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Identity and Factionalism

This definition of democracy does not imply one must give up one’s
identity as a Scotsman or a Catholic to be part of a democracy but implicitly recognizes that all people have multiple identities within society.
These include personal identities, or the person’s individual self-concept;
role identity, or the identity tied to a social position; and social identity,
or the identity that ties them to various social groups.18 A person’s role
identity as a citizen is key to the idea of a political system’s legitimacy.
When the social identity of ethnic or religious group members dictates
their actions as citizens, then democracy becomes difficult if not impossible. In cases where social identity dictates personal and role identity
behaviors, factionalism can result.
Factionalism occurs when ethnic or other parochial groups, which
regularly compete for political influence, promote agendas that favor their
group members over common, secular, or crosscutting agendas thereby
dominating economic and political competition.19 Many scholars recognize this “winner-take-all approach to politics is often accompanied by
confrontational mass mobilization, as occurred in Venezuela in the early
2000s and Thailand prior to the 2006 military coup, and by the intimidation or manipulation of electoral competition.”20 In an unconsolidated
democracy, factionalism increases the odds of instability and failure. In
regions like Africa, with strong tribal identities and colonial boundaries
drawn without consideration for historical tribal territories, factionalism
is particularly problematic. In fact, a recent study on forecasting political
instability found that “every African country that mixed partial democracy with
factionalism suffered instability” [italics in the original].21

Metrics of Democratic Transition

Metrics commonly used when discussing democratization
measure either the potential for democratization or the indicators of
successful democratization.

Potential for Democratization

At the national level, policymakers suggest many factors are critical
to democratic transitions; however, the positive factors of economics,
education, and cultural values, as well as the negative factor of fractionalization continue to top the list. Perhaps the most consistent factor
in democratic liberalization has been the economic condition of the
population. Identified early on by the gross domestic product or gross
national income per capita, economic conditions have been frequently
connected with the transition to democracy. But, economic conditions
alone, while necessary, are not a sufficient condition to initiate a transition to democracy in the population. Many countries, including Saudi
18 Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets, Identity Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
19 Jack A. Goldstone et al., “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” American
Journal of Political Science 54, no. 1 (January 2010): 190–208, doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x.
20 Ibid., 196.
21 Jack Goldstone et al., “A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability,” Fund for Fallen
Allies, http://fundforfallenallies.org/sites/fundforfallenallies.org/files/library/A%20Global%20
Forecasting%20Model%20for%20Political%20Instability.pdf (accessed April 22, 2016). In an earlier
version of the paper, Africa was looked at separately.
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Arabia, have a high gross domestic product per capita yet have not even
begun the transition to democracy.
A strong correlation between the transition to democracy and the
level of education also exists. Early studies on education centered only
on literacy, but recently researchers began measuring average adult
education levels as well as the potential for children’s education. In addition to formal education, the number and availability of various sources
of information also matter. If the information we receive only validates
our belief in the superiority of an ethnic or religious group, then our
perceptions of that group’s superiority are unlikely to change. Conversely,
receiving information from multiple sources offering confl icting points
of view requires us to reconsider our restricted view of reality.
Theoretically, changes in these two factors can result in favorable changes to the values that support democracy, commonly called
“democratic values.” Based on the definition of democracy used in this
article, the key value is individuality—the belief that each human is an
individual, autonomous of the group, with equal rights and obligations.
Shifting perceptions of this value in a population positively affects
liberalization, which is the first step in a natural democratic transition.22
In contrast to these positive factors, measures of fractionalization
do not indicate the potential for a successful democratic transition but
rather the potential for failure. Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization,
known as ELF, calculates the probability that two randomly chosen
people in a given country would be from different ethnic groups and is
available for 129 countries.23 Other social and political sciences measure
factionalism in the context of ethnic groups becoming politically active
in a divisive manner or Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups, known as
PREG. Although this measure is a better metric for indicating threats
to democratic potential, and it identifies situations in which fractionalization becomes politically divisive, the data are only available for a
limited number of countries.24 Fractionalization not only creates an
“us versus them” mentality that runs counter to democratic values
but has also been shown to slow economic growth critical to effective
democratic consolidation.25

Indicators of Successful Democratization

The indicators of successful democratization generally identify
government and social institution outcomes paralleling the phases of
democratic transition—liberalization, transition, and consolidation.
Leaders can determine the status of liberalization by asking several
questions about the current regime or the one immediately preceding
the military intervention:

22 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy.
23 William Easterly and Ross Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4 (1997): 1203–50, doi:10.1162/003355300555466; and Daniel
N. Posner, “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa,” American Journal of Political Science 48, no.
4 (October 2004): 849–63.
24 Posner, “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization.”
25 Easterly and Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy”; and Joseph Wright, “Political Competition
and Democratic Stability in New Democracies,” British Journal of Political Science 38, no. 2 (April 2008):
221–45, doi:10.1017/S0007123408000124.
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1. Has the regime made political concessions in regards to human rights
issues?
2. Does the regime have no, or almost no, political prisoners?
3. Does the regime tolerate political or social opposition groups?
4. Does more than one legally recognized political party exist?
5. Do any members of the opposing political party hold seats in the
parliament or legislature?
6. Are there trade unions or professional organizations not controlled by
state apparatuses?
7. Is there an independent press and access to nongovernmental news
sources?26
This list of questions is not exhaustive, and we should not settle
for simple yes or no answers as the answer in many cases is likely to be
“no.” An amount of gradation is preferable to give a more nuanced view;
the more positive the answer, the closer the country is to progressing
through liberalization. A hasty measure of liberalization is the Freedom
House ratings of countries as Free (liberalization complete), Partially
Free (liberalization in progress), or Not Free (liberalization not started).27

Measures of Transition

The US military invests considerable time and effort into measuring
transition, and we have a vast list of metrics frequently applied. Various
Department of Defense and Department of State entities worked
together to create the Measuring Progress in a Confl ict Environments
framework that covers all phases of the confl ict environment from
imposing stability though self-sustaining peace. Included in this system
are metrics for the three drivers of conflict and the seven indicators of
institutional performance.28

Measures of Success in Consolidating Democracy

Most of the metrics that measure successful democratic consolidation examine the nature of the government. The Polity IV dataset,
for example, uses six component measures that record key qualities of
executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political
competition to examine a governing authority.29 The most consistent
single factor in ensuring successful democratic consolidation, however,
is not one of governmental efficiency. It is a metric associated with the
potential for democratic transition: the gross domestic product per
capita. While theorists still disagree on the minimum economic requirements for successful transitions to democracy, even the most ardent
critic agrees that states are unlikely to fall back into autocracy once the

26 Schneider and Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition, and Consolidation.”
27 “Freedom in the World 2015,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report
/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.WIi8k6q7pzM (accessed January 24, 2017).
28 John Agoglia, Michael Dziedzic, and Barbara Sotirin, eds., Measuring Progress in Conflict
Environments (MPICE): A Metrics Framework (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010).
29 Polity IV, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2012,”
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (accessed March 20, 2013).
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country’s gross domestic product per capita reaches about $12,800 in
2016 dollars.30

System for Gauging Eﬀort

Where the mission includes promoting democracy on any level, the
ability to estimate the amount of time required to complete that political
task is helpful. Looking only at the political approach, the task appears
relatively simple—create a constitution, hold an election, and behold
the democracy. This approach suggests success can be accomplished in
3 to 5 years; however, this focus omits the other phases of democratization. Without liberalization, the population will not likely accept the new
democracy as legitimate. Without consolidation, failure remains a risk.
US strategic planners need the capability to estimate the total time
required for democratization, not just the time required for the politicalinstitutional approach. To that end, a simple, yet demonstrably viable,
method to estimate the effort toward democratization graphs a country’s data from two readily available open-source metrics, the Human
Development Index and the World Values Survey, that correlate with the
status of consolidation. The Human Development Index moves away
from simple economic factors like gross domestic product and centers
instead on measuring improvements in human well-being—long life by
life expectancy at birth, education level by mean of years of schooling
for adults aged 25 years and expected years of schooling for children of
school entering age, and economic security by gross national income
per capita.31
The World Values Survey asks a series of questions about every
5 years to determine values most important to the societies of over
80 countries, which can be used to produce an estimate of societal
values such as communal or individualistic.32 Historically, communal
values have not supported democratic legitimacy and individualistic
values have; therefore, determinations can be made regarding the
prevalence of ethnic divisions associated with fractionalization and
factionalism.33 More specifically, Switzerland, a country with French,
German, and Italian ethnolinguistic groups, displays almost no factionalism in large part because of the society’s high level of individualistic
values. Available for more countries than the Politically Relevant Ethic
Groups metric, communal values measures can estimate the potential
for destructive factionalism.

Measurement of Democratic Attributes

Data about a nation’s government in terms of attributes associated
with democratic and autocratic regimes from the Polity IV Project can
30 Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World,
1950–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
31 “Human Development Index,” United Nations Development Program (UNDP), http://hdr
.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi (accessed March 20, 2012).
32 “Data & Documentation,” World Values Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
/WVSContents.jsp (accessed February 27, 2012); and Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural
Change, and Democracy.
33 Questions link directly to whether ethnic or religious diversity is economically or politically
divisive—for example, a person’s willingness to work with, or live next to, members of another
ethnic group.
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demonstrate a country’s propensity toward democracy.34 The project
examines governing authorities using six component measures that
record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. The results combine into a
21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy) correlating to the Human Development Index. Only
three categories—consolidated or full democracies (+10), more democratic than autocratic leanings (+1 through +9), and more autocratic
than democratic leanings (0 through -10)—are needed to distinguish
nondemocratic regimes from partially democratic regimes and from
completely consolidated democracies.

Dimensions

When graphing country data from the Human Development Index
(y-axis) and societal values from the World Values Survey (x-axis), an
obvious arc develops from widely scattered points in the lower left quadrant, representing countries with communal societies and low citizen
well-being, to a narrow band of points in the upper right quadrant,
depicting highly individualistic societies with high citizen well-being.
As the majority of consolidated democracies appear in the upper right
quadrant and there are no poor, uneducated democracies or autocracies
with individualistic values in the lower right quadrant, leaders can use
the graph to assess countries’ democratic attributes.
Although the previously mentioned graph would demonstrate the
relationship between a nation’s development and societal values, it would
not help determine the time and effort required to make changes that
promote democracy. Moreover, plotting 12 countries over 15 years in the
liberalization-transition period or in consolidation, illustrates democratization can take many years of effort, assuming a country achieves gross
domestic product per capita and education levels.35 In such a graph, the
progress of countries such as Mexico and India trends up and generally
to the right, even though the consolidation is not completed yet. Brazil
and Sweden steadily trend toward higher Human Development Index
and World Values Survey figures while the democratic attributes of some
countries such as the United Kingdom and Finland fluctuate along both
the Human Development Index and World Values Survey axis. Japan’s
development vacillates even though its values trend upwards.

Guidelines

Democratization can be visualized as the process of a polity going
through liberalization that sets the condition for transition. Following
transition, consolidation occurs as the population adopts the democratic
values of individualism.36 If there has been a period of liberalization,
the timeline depends on the country reaching the levels of economic
34 “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2012,” Polity IV,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (accessed March 20, 2013).
35 Mark J. Gasiorowski and Timothy J. Power, “The Structural Determinants of Democratic
Consolidation: Evidence from the Third World,” Comparative Political Studies 31, no. 6 (December
1998): 740, doi:10.1177/0010414098031006003.
36 This is not the only model. Others have argued that liberalization is not necessary prior to
the transition to democracy. See Christopher Hobson, “Liberal Democracy and Beyond: Extending
the Sequencing Debate,” International Political Science Review 33, no. 4 (March 2012): 441–54,
doi:10.1177/0192512111432563.
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prosperity and of education needed to sustain a democracy. Specifically,
democratization requires a gross domestic product per capita of $5,000
and a literacy rate of 40 percent—a little less than half of consolidation
requirements. Though arbitrary, these numbers provide a goal for
successful liberalization and transition as well as a benchmark for
calculating the additional 5 to 10 years to complete transition and to
begin consolidation. For successful liberalization, the gross domestic
product per capita and literacy rate should nearly double. The economic
and educational aspects of democratization are normally beyond the
control of the military, so other entities should be intimately involved
in the operation.
Generally, a country that has already begun the process of liberalization, has an educated citizenry, and has the potential for a robust,
distributed economy can consolidate into a self-sustaining democracy in
roughly 15 years. Post-World War II (WW II) Germany with its history
of a republican government and educated population, would be such a
case. Germany’s experience with the Weimar Republic (1919–33) was
generally positive, and the republic might have succeeded had the 1929
Great Depression not occurred. Still, the experience with democracy and
its failings set the stage for West Germany’s postwar democratization.37
In contrast, many of the postcolonial countries that transitioned to
democracy after WW II returned to autocracy within 20 years.38 These
counties were generally poor, uneducated, and had no prior experience
with democracy. In the middle of these two extremes are countries like
Iraq, which have a relatively educated population and potentially favorable economic conditions but have not begun liberalization and have no
experience with democratic governments or democratic ideals. Democratization in Iraq could easily take decades to complete, and factionalism
will have to be addressed to complete a successful consolidation.39
A general review of democratization efforts provides some general
guidelines to estimate the required length of involvement. Assuming
regime collapse, 2 years of military governance followed by 3 years of
transition to civil authority and rebuilding the basic civil infrastructure
is safe to assume. If all of the conditions are favorable, a democratic transition could be conducted and be safely on its way to consolidation in an
additional 5 to 10 years. If liberalization has not started but the country
has prior experience with democracy or competitive government, then
10 years can be added to the transition period. If liberalization has not
started and the country has no experience with democracy or competitive political systems, then 20 years of effort must be added to the task.40
If the country has the potential for factionalism, then transition toward
democracy probably cannot proceed until leaders address the underlying
problems. These are, of course, very rough estimates and every country
is unique. Further, if there is little hope of reaching the necessary economic and educational levels, other options should be considered.
37 Michael Bernard, “Democratization in Germany: A Reappraisal,” Comparative Politics 33, no.
4 (July 2001).
38 Duncan Fraser, “Long Waves in Economics—Waves of Democracy,” Democratization 8, no. 4
(Winter 2001): 41–64, doi:10.1080/714000228.
39 Bruce E. Moon, “Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq,” International Security
33, no. 4 (Spring 2009): 115–48.
40 Schneider and Schmitter, “Liberalization, Transition, and Consolidation.”
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Implications for Defense Policy

From the onset of planning, strategists must consider the political
end state. Before the first shots are fired, consideration must already have
been given to setting the conditions for the postconfl ict environment,
which requires assessing the target country’s preconfl ict sociopolitical
status. A society that previously existed under the thumb of a dictator
is not likely able to administer a protodemocratic government on its
own; therefore, leaders should establish control in areas behind the division rear and remain in charge of the entire territory upon achieving
military victory.
Furthermore, the occupying force must identify and co-opt spoilers
to the democratic process as well as identify potential partners in democratization. Having a military government not only allows those things
to happen but also ensures that whatever infrastructure survives the
battle remains intact and impedes humanitarian crisis. The last manual
published by the US Army dealing with a full-scale military government
was printed in 1947; still, the security and stability provided by such
an involvement will be indispensable in setting the conditions for the
later transition.41
The breadth and depth of the commitment must also be considered and weighed against other looming threats. The recently published
Priorities for 21st Century Defense states that the US Army will no longer be
sized to conduct prolonged stability operations.42 Unfortunately, to have
any hope of a successful consolidation, democratization can require
decades of military security assistance after the transitional authority
takes command from a military government. Further, real democratization requires a significant security presence—at a minimum three
soldiers for every 1,000 residents are required for initial security duties.43
Until the country’s police and military forces can ensure security,
outside help will be required. For those units assigned this mission, there
will be no returning to forward operating bases at nightfall; properly
trained troops must be out, in force, with the people. This kind of effort
will certainly strain the capabilities of a downsized military and limit our
ability to respond to multiple threats.
Policymakers must consider whether democratization is realistically
achievable or if factionalism should be addressed first. Will the nation’s
natural environment limit the country’s ability to reach the requisite
economic levels required to both create a middle class and pay for
the mass education required to complete democratic consolidation?
What options are available to achieve the minimum economic and
educational requirements?
Partial democracies tend to be the most volatile form of government, and poor multiethnic tribal countries tend not to blossom into

41 US Departments of the Army and Navy, United States Army and Navy Manual of Civil Affairs
Military Government (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947).
42 US Department of Defense (DoD), Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense (Washington, DC: DoD, 2012).
43 Steven M. Goode, “A Historical Basis for Force Requirement in Counterinsurgency,”
Parameters 39, no. 1 (Winter 2009–10): 45–57.
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democracies on their own.44 Leaving the job half done may create greater
problems in the future. When present, factionalism may require more
creative options such as closely controlled partitioning, a lesson learned
from efforts in the former Yugoslavia.45
To see this approach in practice, a quick analysis of Afghanistan
and Iraq will serve as a simplified and limited example. Beginning with
the baseline human developmental index, which includes economic and
educational data, the examination will then determine liberalization,
and end by assessing other factors.
In 2015, Afghanistan had a human development index of 0.465 with
a gross national income per capita of $1,885.30.46 If placed on the x-axis
of the previously mentioned graph, Afghanistan would be graphed to
the left of the Human Development Index benchmark of 0.700 that
represents the value in which liberalization becomes possible. As to be
expected, Freedom House rates Afghanistan as Not Free, indicating that
liberalization has not begun.47 Based on this cursory review, the primary
focus in Afghanistan should be on economic growth. Planners can also
see that several decades could easily be required to build the economic
infrastructure before political liberties and individual civil rights will
likely become a priority to the general population.
Better than Afghanistan in some ways and worse in others, Iraq has
a 0.654 human development index, which would be graphed closer to
the 0.700 baseline, and a gross national income per capita of $14,003.20,
which is a much better economic condition.48 Liberalization, however,
has not started in earnest. Freedom House also rates Iraq as Not Free.49
While both Afghanistan and Iraq are fractionalized, Iraq has one
additional problem: its ethnic and religious factions are well developed
and have been vying for political power for years. This infighting will
likely produce internal instability that will keep liberalization from
taking root. Iraq may not be able to make further progress until a solution to the fractionalization is found.
Based on this extremely cursory analysis and a population of 33.4
million people, Afghanistan would require an initial total commitment of
approximately 100,000 security personnel for a period ranging between
25 and 40 years. This estimate assumes inclusive economic institutions
could create a fivefold increase in the average Afghan’s income within
the first 15 years of the effort.50 With a population of 37.6 million in
Iraq and a better economic situation, that nation’s timeframe would be
44 David L. Epstien et al., “Democratic Transitions,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3
(July 2006): 551–69, doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00201.x.
45 For a discussion on partitioning, see Carter Johnson, “Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty,
Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): doi:10.1162
/isec.2008.32.4.140; and Jaroslav Tir, “Dividing Countries to Promote Peace: Prospects for LongTerm Success of Partitions,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 5 (2005): doi:10.1177/0022343305056228.
46 “Afghanistan: Human Development Indicators,” UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries
/profiles/AFG (accessed January 24, 2017).
47 “Freedom in the World 2015: Afghanistan,” Freedom House.
48 “Iraq: Human Development Indicators,” UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles
/IRQ (accessed January 24, 2017).
49 “Freedom in the World 2015: Iraq,” Freedom House.
50 For an explanation of inclusive economic institutions, see Daron Acemoglu and James A.
Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Publishing,
2012).
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reduced, but still, require a security force of 112,000 personnel for 20
years until liberalization could take hold and democratic institutions
become self-sustaining. In both cases, the security force size would need
to be adjusted up or down as conditions on the ground dictate.51
This overview of the developmental aspects of promoting
democracy and stability provides planners with a quantifiable frame
of reference to help them set the conditions for political victory when
the victory includes democratization. The information presented here
can be used to help explain to commanders and civilian leadership why
democratization can take so long as well as what aspects of development
might be most important, helping bridge the gap between military and
political victory.
Armed with this understanding of democratization, military leaders
can provide better advice to the civilian administration as to what
is achievable—creating a stable democracy—as well as requirements of
time, troops, and treasure commitments. As one commentator put it,
“success in Germany and Japan, moreover, was achieved by policies that
focused on sweeping economic, political, and educational reforms that
affected the entire population for several decades.”52 The information
presented here will help planners and commanders understand why
such reforms are necessary and appreciate the level of time and effort
involved in creating a self-sustaining democracy. Thus, commanders
and planners can set conditions for political victory lest military
victories become hollow ones.

51 See Goode, “Force Requirement in Counterinsurgency.”
52 Karin von Hippel, “Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building,”
Washington Quarterly 23, no. 1 (2000): 95, doi:10.1162/016366000560764.

